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Marquette University 
Philosophical pleasure canes in about as 
many shapes and sizes as personal computers 
do, but one of the keenest pleasures, at 
least to my way of thinking, is having an 
article or book actually convince an intelli-
gent reader of an important truth (or at 
least supposed truth) not previous1y be-
lieved. That, however, is as rare as it is 
satisfying, and anyone who thinks it his/her 
due dreams, as Spinoza says, with his/her 
eyes open. P,robably next best is to be taken 
seriously and read carefully by SUcl1 an in-
telligent reader, but to be disagreed with 
nonetheless. And from Evelyn Pluhar, I am 
happy to say--or happy enough to say--I have 
been awarded not the brass ring but the tin 
facsimile of same. 
I 
In "Speciesism Not Justified," [l] Pluhar 
takes issue with two of my basic points in 
"In Defense of Speciesism" (2] and attacks 
both on ~ny number of gro~ds. She also 
raises several objections to peripheral 
points in the paper, but I will pass over 
those here. What I would like to do is to 
orient the reader by sketching (by quoting) 
the skeletal outline of the main argument of 
"In Defense of Speciesism" and then to dis-
cuss Pluhar's charges. Here's the Sketch: 
(1] The concepts of a human being 
and a person are not related merely 
empirically, and human persons can 
and do identify with human non-
persons. This identification--
which is not sympathy or compassion 
but a recognition of oneself and 
what one was (a fetus, a child) or 
could be (brain-damaged, comatose, 
retarded, etc. )--has metaI;hysical 
or quasi-metaI;hysical underpinnings 
[which are described earlier in "In 
Defense of Speciesism" and will be 
discussed below]. 
(2 ] The existence of human persons 
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is constrained by laws of nature 
and by particular empirical facts 
of existence; e.g., there is not 
enough protein in a given child's 
diet for his/her brain to develop 
properly [that is, for him/her to 
develop into a human person]. 
There is little to nothing that 
individual human beneficiaries or 
victims can do about this, so far 
as their own case is concerned. 
[ 3 ] Chance occurrences, many of 
them unforeseen, to which all HOlID 
sapiens are subject, may well pre-
vent a human fran beooming a person 
(e.g., genetically linked retarda-
tion) or rob a person of his/her 
personhood (e.g., senility). A-
gain, it is not within our power to 
make ourselves invulnerable to such 
contingencies, or, in most cases, 
to foresee them with any great 
accuracy, or to prevent them from 
occurring. 
[4] Hllll'afl non-persons, then, should 
be ascribed basic rights; for al-
though in the primary case it is 
persons who are ascribed basic 
rights, equality of opportunity, 
or, better, fairness, requires us 
to ascribe basic rights to human 
non-persons as well (p. 52). 
Such, in very brief forIn. is the main 
outline of the argument. My main thesis, to 
be absolutely clear about the matter, is that 
all members of a species generally character-
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ized by personhood have a right to life. For 
all intents and purfDses, this amoW1ts to 
"All human beings (taking the term in a pure-
ly biological sense) have a right to life." 
Hence, on it alone, unsupplemented with other 
principles, a human being who is not a person 
is ascribed a right to life, while a psyd~o-
·lryJically indistinguishable member of another 
species is not. Speciesism, as the tenrr is 
usually used, is an appropriate label for 
this fDsition, even if the term can, and 
often does, cover more ground than the single 
thesis in question. 
II 
Pluhar writes that I "defend [my] pro-
posal by making two appeals: [one] to meta-
physics (or'quasi-metaphysics' ) , [one] to 
fairness" (p. 123). But, as even the brief 
outline of the argument quoted above shows, 
there are at least four main stages (or "ap-
peals") to it. Not that Pluhar's oversight 
lets me off tile hook. Concentrating mainly 
on [1] and [4], she finds plenty to object 
to. 
Concerning [1], I wrote that "personal 
identity seems to be closely tied to [human] 
bodily identity, with the latter seeming to 
be either a necessary condition for the form-
er, or criteriologically related to [it]" (p. 
49). Criterion, in this case, is (partly) 
explained, following Shoemaker, in terms of 
its being a necessary truth that human bodily 
identity is evidence for personal identity. 
I note, however, that the principle just 
announced really concerns re-identifying per-
sons, not identifying them, and it is identi-
fying persons which is of parallount imfDrt-
ance as far as the ascription of basic rights 
is concerned. But a related principle, 
(IP) It's a necessary truth that 
the statement "X is a live hunan 
being" is good evidence for the 
statement "X is a hlJIIBIl person," 
is true, or at least plausible, I maintain, 
and it is directly relevant to the ascription 
of basic rights. Pluhar's first batch of 
charges--four, by my count--centers on what I 
say here. 
The first is that I don't defend (IP) 
but simply say that it is "a near relative" 
of the re-identification principle, which I 
also don't defend but merely claim others do. 
I plead guilty to both charges--but will 
spend no time behind bars. A pape.r on spe-
ciesism is no place to discuss the re-identi-
f ication principle, especially as the litera-· 
ture on it is so vast. And, secondly, 
thought the relation between it and. (Ip) 
obvious. 
Plul1ar doesn't. Her se=nd objection is 
that she sees no relation between the two and 
that 
surely the "identity" referred to 
by the [re-identification] princi-
pIe is not the same as the "identi-
fication" referred to in (IP). In 
the former case, we are speaking of 
identity in the sense of "same-
ness;"· in the case of (IP), the 
recognition ("identification") of 
personhood is the issue (p. 123). 
"Recognition" is really out of place here--no 
such term occurs in (IP)--and "sameness" is a 
red herring of another sort. For the re-
identification principle simply tells us that 
t.nere is a criteriological relation between 
human bodies and human persons over time. If 
that is indeed so, if the track of a person 
over time is conceptually tied up with, cri-
teriologically related to, the track of a 
hUffi:m body (that is, a human being) over 
time, that must be because at any given time 
the very existence of a person is conceptual-
ly tied up with, criteriologically related 
to, the existence of a human body (that is, a 
human being). I don I t see how anyone could 
hold to the re-identification principle with-
out also holding to conceptually prior (IP). 
For, to deny (IP) while holding fast to the 
re-identification principle would be like 
accepting the principl~s of calculus while 
rejecting those of basic arithmetic. Identi-
fication, after all, is conceptually prior to 
re-identification. 
Third, says Pluhar, 
(IP) is quite implausible on the 
face of it. It is easy enough to 
. imagine a world in which "X is a 
live human being" is not good evi-
dence for "X is a human person" (p. 
123). 
I suppose that what she has in mind here are 
worlds in which all, or at least many, of the 
hunan beings born in it are brain damaged, or 
retarded, or suffer sane mental failing that 
precludes personhood; or perhaps all or most 
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lose their personhood early in life. Arguing 
by inductive enumeration in such a· world, 
Pluhar would say (I'm supposing), "x is a 
live human being" does not inductively war-
rant "K is a human person." 
True enough, but not really to the 
point. For such considerations don't show 
(IP) false; what they show is that in such 
worlds countervailing empirical considera-
tions obtain that prevent concluding "K is a 
hum:ln person" straightaway; that is, the 
evidential weight that (IP) speaks of is 
simply overridden in individual cases in such 
worlds, and the conclusion, "x is a human 
person," w01.l1d be, overall, unwarranted. 
That's hardly surprising. (IP) doesn't say 
that it's a necessary truth that "X is a 
human being" ::Ls a logically sufficient condi-
tion for "X is a human person," only that 
it's a necessary truth that it's good evi-
dence. All ,inductive principles, even the 
best of them, and even criteriological prin-
ciples, may have to give way in particular 
circumstances in the face of evidence to the 
contrary. The chief difference between non-
criteriologicql and criteriological arguments 
lies only in the claim to necessity. With 
criteria, in the sense in question, we 
know that [something] is evidence, 
not by having observed correlations 
and discovered empirical generali-
zations, but by understanding the 
concept 0 [~, in this case] 
and the meaning of statements about 
the identity of 0's.[3] 
Fourth, Pluhar says, 
Suppose we accept (IP); what would 
it show? At best, it would show 
that all live human beings are 
presumptive persons. This presump-
tion is obviously not sufficient 
for the ascription of basic rights 
to human non-persons (assuming, as 
Wreen does) that persons are the 
primary possessors of basic rights 
(pp. 123-4). 
Again, I agree. But my agreement shows only 
why the argument has four stages, not one. 
III 
Far worse than any of this, though, is 
Pluhar's misunderstanding of what (IP) and my 
surrounding discussion of it are doing in "In 
Defense of Speciesism." It is there, she 
thinks, not because I take it seriously in 
and of itself and wish to use it to argue for 
speciesism. No, it is there only to get the 
reader to empathize with human non-persons: 
We are to imagine ourselves in· the 
other's place. • • "Identifica-
tion" in this sense is really empa-
thy•••• "Identification" in this 
sense is utterly different from 
that of "identification" in (IP) 
(p. 124). 
Thus, I am guilty, supposedly, not only of a 
gross equivocation on "identification" but 
also of holding "that we have no [very great] 
ability to identify with [that is, empathize 
with] non-human non-persons (p. 124)." 
Adapting a remark of Kipling's here, I 
can only say, "Not so, but far otherwise." 
First, (IP) is there not to elicit some sort 
of emPQ.thic response from the reader but to 
show him/her, whatever his/her psychological 
constitution, that human non-persons are in 
the same metaphysical boat as human persons 
are as far as personhood, the primary ground 
for the ascription of. basic rights, is con-
cerned; and, by implication of silence, if it 
weren't explicitly noted in the paper (p. 53) 
and suggested by its title, that no non-human 
animals are our metaphysical fellow-travel-
ers. The paper is a defense of speciesism, 
so principles that distinguish members of the 
human species from members of others in a way 
that has at least an indirect connection with 
a rrorally important concept, such as basic 
rights, would be what I was after. 
Secondly, I certainly know that many 
people have no trouble empathizing with ani-
mals of all sorts of shapes, sizes, colors, 
and textures. tJlany, I have no doubt, find it 
far easier to emPQ.thize with dogs, cats, 
birds, cows, seals, or whatever than with 
hwrens. Great stuff, emPQ.thy, and best wish-
es to all who use it wisely and well. But 
empathy has nothing to do with my use of 
"identify with." When I write that we iden-
tify with human non-persons in a way that we 
don't with non-hwren non-persons and that 
(IP) provides the grounds for this, all I 
mean is that the comrron judgment "That could 
be me" holds for all human beings, whether 
persons or not, that it doesn't for non-h\JIT"ICU""l 
non-persons, and that the judgment has solid 
metaphysical or quasi-metaphysical backing, 
namely (IP). The person who makes such a 
25 BEI'WEEN THE SPECIES 
judgment could be inncx:::ent of all philosophy, 
not aware of (IP) at all, and devoid of 
empathy, for all that "identify with" re-
quires. Walter Weber, for example, a friend 
of mine of a distinctly unemotional nature, 
identifies with many human beings that have 
no inner life or a radically diminished one--
the brain damaged, congenitally retarded, or 
permanently insane, tc cite three[4]--and 
some of these human beings, lacking an inner 
life as they do, c-.an't be (rationally) empa-
thized with. On the other hand, I myself 
empathize with all sorts of non-human non-
persons--genets, sloths, and kudu, for exam-
ple. My argument is Kantian, and even the 
rnost unsympathetic--and here I explicitly add 
"and most unempathic"--Puritan can and does 
identify with human non-persons. Pluhar's 
remarks about psychological identification 
and empathy are thus one and all beside the 
point. If I had been interested in empathy, 
the term would have occurred in the article. 
It doesn't, and its younger sibling, sympa-
thy, is explicitly disowned. So much for 
older siblings, too. 
Pluhar's second major offensive concerns 
the fourth stage of the argument, the one 
concerning justice. She lodges three objec-
tions here. 
First, she says, 
Wreen has made a case for the a-
scription of basic riqht.s t? those 
human non-persons whose condition 
is no fault of their own. Although 
[he] states that there is little or 
nothing we can do to prevent the 
loss of our personhood, this is 
often not the case. Consider the 
victim of an unsuccessful suicide 
attempt who is now conscious but 
permanently, severely brain da-
maged. Or the Hollywood 
stunt performer who makes a career 
out of dangerous stunts and loses 
his or her personhood as a result. 
• • [And] what about the indivi-
dual who is too fond of fatty foods 
and physical inactivity tc ward 
against arteriosclerosis, becoming 
senile as a result? Or the motcr-
cyclist who refuses to wear a hel-
met? Or the driver or passenger 
who doesn't wear a seat belt? 
'l'hese human non-persons don't have 
a right to life on Wreen's view. 
[But] I, for one, find this thor-
oughly counter-intuitive (pp. 125-
6). 
Well, I needn't hold that such human non-
persons--or animals of selected sorts--don't 
have a right to life, only that, if they do, 
that wouldn I t be on the basis of the argument 
of my paper. 
More importantly, though, Pluhar here 
challenges the claim that I have provided 
sufficient justification for the principal 
contention of the paper, i.e., that all human 
beings have a right to life: and, en route to 
this objection, she also challenges the claim 
that as far as personhood is concerned, there 
is little to nothing that individual human 
beings can do, in their own case, to prevent 
its loss or to aid its development. 
Both of these objections can be handled 
together. Consider the principle that all 
persons have a right to life, a principle 
Pluhar herself holds to and which, as she 
notes, is "relatively uncontroversial" (p• 
122). Does someone who holds this principle 
ipso facto hold that capital punishment is 
immoral, or at least the violation of a right 
to life, or that kilLing a life-threatening 
attacker is the same, or ditto for killing a 
combatant in a just war, and so forth? 'l'he 
answer is, "No." The principle in question 
is implicitly ceteris paribus, just as every 
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other such moral principle is, personhood 
principles (such as the one Pluhar holds) 
included, and is properly understood as de-
feasible under certain conditions. Just as 
it's possible to hold that a murderer has 
forfeited his/her right to life, so it is 
possible to hold (consistent with the argu-
ment of "In Defense of Speciesism") that the 
long-tenn drug addict (who was destroying 
his/her cognitive faculties), the starvation 
victim (who, now no longer a person, refused 
food in protest of government activities), 
the Russian roulette' player (who survives as 
a non-person), the "ffi3.ngled" suicide victim, 
and all of Pluhar's crowd have relinquished, 
waived, or forfeited their right to life by 
recklessly or negligently risking or by in-
tentionally or knowingly jeopardizing or 
attacking their personhood and/or their 
lives. Sure, human persons can do something 
about their personhood--most obviously, sui-
cide itself is conceptually available to 
anyone who 'has a relatively full-blooded 
concept of the self--and even (what is more 
directly relevant to my argument) do some-
thing about their hurranity • But I know as 
much, [5] and these possibilities don't impugn 
my speciesism principle any more than the 
existence of murderers impugns Pluhar's per-
sonhood principle. 
Second, Pluhar asks, 
what sense does it make to talk [as 
I do] about the unfairness or in-
justice of nature or the universe, 
or about basic rights being accord-
ed as restitution or compensation 
for such injustice • • • or [about] 
"a Supreme Court of Justice of the 
Cosmos" (p. 126). 
My response within the paper, that such talk 
(about the Cosmos) is merely metaphorical, 
and used for its imagistic vivacity and lin-
guistic convenience, she rejects--though I 
see no reason why. But she then goes on to 
say that if such talk really is extirpable, 
as I say it is, then I "need to show us how 
to cast [the] argument in [just such a non-
metaphorical] way" (p. 126). 
The showing in question is edSY enough, 
though: just read "In Defense of Speciesism" 
without the phrases in question--ar read this 
paper as it stands. I deliberately baited 
the hook with talk about the Cosmos being 
unjust and the universe according compensa-
tion, hoping to elicit an obvious objection 
(though the objection was also answered in 
"In Defense of Speciesism"), but also hoping, 
and hoping with greater avidity, to evoke the 
Big Picture and remind the reader of the 
place of persons in the universe--that is, of 
their inherently biological nature, vulnera-
bility, limited power, empirical needs as 
persons, developnent over time, and lack of 
control over the contingent circumstances 
surrounding their personhood. Conceptually, 
however, the appeal at the fourth stage of 
the argument is simply to a principle of 
justice. There is, at base, no personifying 
of anyone or anything except persons--and, in 
a different sense, of human non-persons. [6] 
Last, still another objection which 
Pluhar finds more powerful than I do: my 
argument is circular, she claims, for I in-
voke justice to ascribe h~~ non-persons 
basic rights--basic rights being their due---
but to invoke justice is itself to assume 
that human non-persons have a basic right, 
namely, the right to justice. The argument 
is thus circular or question-begging.[7] 
Not so. The circle can be, and is, 
broken if we distinguish betWeen justice (or 
fairness or equality) as a principle and 
justice (or fairness or equality) as a right. 
The latter is indeed a right, namely the 
right to be treated justly, but it is not 
invoked in my argument for speciesism. it is 
equality as a principle--"all creatures in 
the relevant (person-related) class are to be 
treated fairly and equally in respect to 
personhood generated rights--which is used in 
the argument. As principles frequently 
ground rights--e.g., age principles ground 
driving rights--or ground their denial--e.g., 
incarceration principles ground the denial of 
voting rights--the distinction between prin-
ciples and rights is, without further argu-
ment to the contrary, available for use. 
v 
The attention to and concern with non-
human anim3.ls found on a number of academic 
fronts these days is all to the good and, in 
the long run, will probably help effect 
needed changes concerning at least some of 
the ways we think about and behave toward 
members of other species. But worthy goals 
are one thing, extreme and unwarranted means 
to achieve them quite another. One of these 
means, and a decidedly popular one at the 
present time, is to deny the importance, and 
even the relevance, of species membership as 
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far as ethical matters are concerned. Rac-
ism, sexism, and speciesism, it's said that 
they're all one and the same thing: taking 
mere biology to have ethical import. It 
sounds right, that slogan does. But in actu-
ality, it ignores far too many imp:>rtant and 
pervasive facts about ourselves and the world 
we live in, facts which sculpt the main con-
tours of our lives and concepts, ethical 
concepts included, and provide the very p:>s-
sibilities for the realization of value and 
disvalue in the world. Whether a biological 
difference makes for a valuational difference 
and, if so, how it does depend on the nature 
of the biological difference, the nature of 
the world, and how and how intimately the 
biological difference figures into the scheme 
of values entire. Only disembodied spirits 
can ignore biology altogether. 
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1. Evelyn Pluhar, "Speciesism Not Just-
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60. Subsequent references are indicated in 
parentheses. 
3. Sydney Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and 
Self-Identity (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1962), p. 4. 
4. This, in fact, is part of the point 
of the three cases I cite in "In Defense of 
Speciesism" (pp. 49, 51, 53). I am not sure 
that Pluhar quite understood this (p. 125). 
5. An earlier version of "In Defense of 
Speciesism" included six objections to the 
main argument (and my answers to them), but 
these had to be eliminated due to space con-
siderations. One was the objection just 
discussed. 
6. P1uhar implies that I say that all 
proPJilents of basic rights speak of the Su-
preme Court of Justice of the Cosrros. This 
is inaccurate. What I say is that all anti-
speciesists (or better, all anti-speciesists 
who accord non-h\.llffiTl animals intrinsic moral 
standing) use a term like compensation, rest-
itution, or sane such metaphorically, that 
is, in a derivative sense. That still seems 
to me correct. Pluhar herself speaks of 
empathizing with non-human animals who are in 
pain, and that requires anthropomorphizing 
such animals to at least some extent. As 
Wittgenstein taught us, the prilnaxy case for 
the ascription of pain is the adult hwnan 
being, and the same p:>int holds for all psy-
chological or (intrinsic) moral ascriptions. 
Anyone who ascribes rights or intrinsic moral 
standing to animals, then, does so on the 
basis of the model of an adult human being. 
7. This is another of the objections 
alluded to in note 5. 
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